The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching
Electronic Devices at the Border: An
Empirical Study
Matthew B. Kugle4
It is axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the
inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in
protecting, its territorialintegrity.
United States v Flores-Montano1
It is frightening the number of ways I had not even considered being "violated"priorto this survey.

Subject 1892
INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment protects the right of individuals to
be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." 3 The recurring question in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, then, is the reasonableness
of a given search in a given context. This Comment analyzes the
reasonableness of searches of electronic devices-smartphones,
laptops, and tablets-in the context of a border crossing. When a
traveler enters the country, whether at an airport or a land border, how much protection should the contents of his or her electronic gadgets be given? Historically, all of a traveler's possessions could be thoroughly searched, even without cause, because
Fourth Amendment protections are substantially relaxed at the
border. 4 But, given the sheer amount of personal information
that can be recovered from a smartphone's text message log or a
computer's e-mail archive, is it "reasonable" to give government
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1 541 US 149, 153 (2004).
2
A participant in the empirical study that forms the basis of this Comment, after
rating the intrusiveness of various border searches. See note 198.
3
US Const Amend IV.
4
See United States v Montoya de Hernandez,473 US 531, 538-40 (1985).
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agents unfettered discretion to search the contents of electronic
devices?
A recent court opinion proposed that such searches should
require an elevated level of suspicion; border agents would not
be able to conduct the search unless they had some specific reason to suspect the traveler of wrongdoing. 5 Scholars advocating
for this type of elevated-suspicion standard base their arguments on the role that electronic devices now play in daily life,
the degree of intrusion into the privacy and dignity of the individuals being searched, and the potential for surprise.6 Courts
have recognized the importance of these factors in evaluating
the reasonableness of border searches, particularly the degree of
intrusion on privacy and dignity interests. 7 When applying these
criteria to searches of electronic devices, however, courts have
disagreed on the magnitude of the privacy intrusion. In United
States v Cotterman,8 for instance, the Ninth Circuit said that
"[i]nternational travelers certainly expect that their property
will be searched at the border. What they do not expect is that,
absent some particularized suspicion, agents will mine every
last piece of data on their devices or deprive them of their most
personal property for days." 9 Based on this assessment, the
Ninth Circuit then concluded that some searches of electronic
devices represent a "substantial intrusion" on privacy and dignity
and should therefore require elevated suspicion. 10 Other courts,
however, have disputed the notion that travelers find searches
of electronic devices any more intrusive or surprising than
searches of their other possessions and have therefore not
reached the same result."
This Comment presents the results of an empirical study of
approximately three hundred adult Americans that measures
the perceived intrusiveness of electronic-device searches and the
5 See United States v Cotterman, 709 F3d 952, 960 (9th Cir 2013) (discussing the
appropriate level of suspicion for searching electronic devices at the border).
6 See, for example, John W. Nelson, Border Confidential: Why Searches of Laptop
Computers at the Border Should Require Reasonable Suspicion, 31 Am J Trial Advoc
137, 141-42 (2007) (discussing laptops as an extension of the person); Rasha Alzahabi,
Note, Should You Leave Your Laptop at Home When Traveling Abroad? The Fourth
Amendment and Border Searches of Laptop Computers, 41 Ind L Rev 161, 179-81 (2008)
(discussing the unprecedented breadth of private information stored on laptops).
7
See, for example, United States v Flores-Montano,541 US 149, 152 (2004).
8 709 F3d 952 (9th Cir 2013).
9
10

Id at 967.
Idat 968.

11 See, for example, United States v Ickes, 393 F3d 501, 502-06 (4th Cir 2005).
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actual expectations of ordinary citizens. The results show that
people see the intrusiveness of electronic-device searches as
comparable to that of strip searches and body cavity searches,
which have generally been held to require elevated suspicion.12
Electronic searches are the most revealing of sensitive information and are only slightly less embarrassing than the most
intimate searches of the body. 13 These searches, therefore, implicate the types of privacy and dignity concerns that the Supreme
Court has stated may lead to an elevated-suspicion requirement. 14 Also, most people believe that their electronic devices are
1
not subject to search without cause at a border crossing. 5 Just
as the Ninth Circuit feared in Cotterman,16 the study suggests a
substantial chance of unfair surprise. By presenting the actual
views and expectations of Americans, these data help quantify
the civil liberty concern that is being weighed against the government's interest in securing the border.
These data are also relevant to a closely related issue in
Fourth Amendment law. The Supreme Court recently ruled on
searches of cell phones incident to arrest in Riley v California.17
There, as in the border search context, the central claim of privacy proponents was that electronic devices are different than
the address books, grocery lists, and briefcases that prior doctrines were designed to handle.18 That claim was endorsed in
Chief Justice John Roberts' majority opinion, which held that
cellular phones could not be searched incident to arrest without
a warrant or exigent circumstances. 19 Though many issues relevant to searches incident to arrest are beyond the scope of this
Comment, the data discussed here do support a key point:
searches of sophisticated electronic devices are almost unique in
their intrusiveness.
Part I reviews the contours of the border search exception,
examining the types of cases that gave rise to the exception.
Part II examines the efforts of courts to apply existing doctrine

12
13
14
15
16
17

See notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
See Table 1.
See text accompanying notes 68-85.
See pp 1195-96.
See Cotterman, 709 F3d at 967.
No 13-132, slip op (US June 25, 2014).
18 See Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UClA L
Rev 27, 36-44 (2008); Matthew E. Orso, CellularPhones, Warrantless Searches,and the New

Frontierof FourthAmendment Jurisprudence,50 Santa Clara L Rev 183, 214-22 (2010).
19 Riley, No 13-132, slip op at 8-10.
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to the novel issues presented by searches of electronic devices.
Part III presents the results of the abovementioned empirical survey, measuring actual expectations, attitudes, and beliefs regarding searches of electronic devices at the border. Part IV considers
the implications of these results for the border search doctrine.
I. THE BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION
Though the issues involved in searches of electronic devices
are new, the border search exception itself has a rich doctrinal
history. To begin, this Part will review the general case law on
border searches. It will then show how it has been applied to
searches of electronic devices.
"A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable" absent "individualized suspicion of wrongdoing;" the police cannot simply
enter and search your house.20 There are a number of important
exceptions to this general rule, however, and in practice many
21
searches are conducted without a warrant or probable cause.
Border searches have historically been viewed as one exception
to the individualized-suspicion requirement. Routine border
searches can occur absent any individualized suspicion because
"[t]he Government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted
persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border."22
Nonroutine, more invasive searches may require a showing of a
low level of individualized suspicion called "reasonable suspicion.23
History of the Exception

A.

The exception to the individualized-suspicion requirement
for border searches traces its origin to an act of the First Congress. This law established a series of customs offices and gave
officials "full power and authority" to enter and search "any ship
or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods,
wares, or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed" and to
secure any such items that were found.24 The act specifically

City of Indianapolisv Edmond, 531 US 32, 37 (2000).
Exceptions relevant here include investigative stops, Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 27
(1968), and searches incident to arrest, New York v Belton, 453 US 454, 460 (1981)
(permitting searches of automobile passenger compartments incident to arrest). But see
generally Arizona v Gant, 556 US 332 (2009) (limiting, and possibly abrogating, Belton).
22 United States v Flores-Montano, 541 US 149, 152 (2004).
23 United States v Montoya de Hernandez,473 US 531, 541 (1985).
24 Act of July 31, 1789 § 24, 1 Stat 29, 43, repealed by Act of Aug 4, 1790 § 74, 1
20

21

Stat 145, 178.
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differentiated between searches conducted on ships at ports of
entry-where "full power and authority" were directly granted
without need for judicial oversight-and those of "any particular
dwelling-house, store, building, or other place" for which the
agents needed to obtain a warrant.2 5 Therefore, searches at the
border could be conducted at the discretion of the customs
agents, whereas searches by customs agents for smuggled goods
at nonborder locations were subject to an external warrant requirement. This waiver of the warrant requirement at the border is the core of the border search exception, and it has been in
place since 1789. The Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed to
the long history of the border search exception as support for its
constitutionality.26
The main wave of modern border search cases has concerned
the smuggling of controlled substances. In the Prohibition-era
case Carroll v United States,21 the Court used the border search
doctrine as a point of comparison in devising a new exception to
the warrant requirement for the search of automobiles.28 The
Carroll Court said that "[t]ravelers may be so stopped [without
cause] in crossing an international boundary because of national
self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to
identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in."29 Automobile searches,
in contrast, were held to require probable cause (though not a
warrant) because the state does not have the same set of strong
interests in the nation's interior that it does at the border, where
a search is presumptively reasonable even without probable
30
cause.
The Court echoed Carroll over fifty years later in United
States v Ramsey,31 stating that the sovereign has a strong interest

Act of July 31, 1789 § 24, 1 Stat at 43.
See, for example, United States v Ramsey, 431 US 606, 616-17 (1977) (noting
that the First Congress also proposed the Bill of Rights, and that the First Congress
therefore can be presumed not to have thought the act inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment); Boyd v United States, 116 US 616, 623 (1886) (observing that "the seizure
of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws ... has been authorized by English
statutes for at least two centuries past").
27 267 US 132 (1925).
28 See id at 153-54. The case concerned the smuggling of alcohol during Prohibition.
See id at 159-60.
29 Idat 154.
30 See id.
31 431 US 606 (1977).
25
26
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in controlling "who and what may enter the country.32 The case
concerned the discovery of illegal drugs in a package mailed to
the United States from Thailand. 33 By statute, postal inspectors
had the power to open packages and inspect their contents without a warrant if they had "reasonable cause to suspect" that the
package contained contraband. 34 In holding the statute constitutional, the Court stated that the proposition "[t]hat searches
made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the
sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons
and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply
by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by
now, require no extended demonstration."35
The defendant in Ramsey attempted to raise a First
Amendment challenge to the mail inspection because his "papers"
(the mail) were subject to search without a warrant, which could
potentially have chilling effects on protected expression.36 The
governing statute in the case barred postal inspectors from reading any letters that were inside the packages that they inspected,
however; 37 the "papers" contained in the mail were accorded
greater protection than the goods and would not be read without
a warrant. Because reading the mail was prohibited by the statute and had not occurred in Ramsey's case, the Court explicitly
did not reach the First Amendment issue. 38 This questionwhether certain types of border searches implicate core civil liberty concerns and should therefore be restricted-underlies
many of the more recent border search cases.
B.

Requirement of Reasonable Suspicion for Nonroutine
Searches

As suggested by the limitation described in Ramsey on reading correspondence found in searched packages, not all border
searches are alike. Some searches-those considered nonroutineare permissible only if the border agent has reasonable suspicion.

32 Id at 620.
33 Id at 609.
34 Id at 611, quoting 19 USC § 482.
35 Ramsey, 431 US at 616.
36 See id at 623-24.
37 See id at 623.
38 See id at 624.
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The term "reasonable suspicion" has its origin in the Terry v
Ohio39 investigative stop case. 40 It is defined as "a particularized

and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped
of criminal activity."41 Though a lesser standard than probable
cause, it requires the officer to be able to articulate something
more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion, or
'hunch.'42 Reasonable suspicion generally cannot be based purely
on demographic characteristics, but it can be found if the sus43
pect fits a detailed offender profile.
Two Supreme Court cases help define the category of nonroutine searches-those that are so intrusive that they cannot
be conducted without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. In
United States v Montoya de Hernandez,44 the Court considered
the case of an alimentary canal smuggler. The defendant, Montoya
de Hernandez, entered the United States at Los Angeles International Airport, having come from Bogota, Colombia.45 Upon
arrival, she aroused suspicion based on inconsistencies and implausibilities in her story. 46 Based on his past experience, the
customs inspector came to believe that Montoya de Hernandez
was likely to be smuggling balloons full of drugs in her digestive
tract. 47 She was offered the choice of leaving the country, submitting to an x-ray, or producing a monitored bowel movement. 48
Logistical problems ultimately prevented her from being able to
take the first option, and she was detained for approximately
sixteen hours before the customs officials sought a warrant for
an x-ray. 49 Though the warrant was granted eight hours later,
the defendant involuntarily produced a bowel movement that
contained the first of many cocaine-filled balloons before the x-ray
could take place.50

39

392 US 1, 37 (1968).

40

Id.

United States v Cortez, 449 US 411, 417-18 (1981).
Terry, 392 US at 27.
43 See United States v Sokolow, 490 US 1, 10 (1989).
44 473 US 531 (1985).
45 Id at 532.
46 See id at 533 (observing, for instance, that the respondent claimed that she was
traveling to the United States to purchase goods for her husband's store but had no appointments scheduled with vendors or suppliers).
47 Id at 534.
48 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 US at 534-35.
49 Id at 535.
50 Id at 534-36.
41
42
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The question before the Court was whether the detention
(which at minimum had to be measured as sixteen hours) was
justified. The Court held that it was, but only because the customs official could "reasonably suspect" that the traveler was
smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal.51 Because a warrant was obtained before a medical examination was ordered,52
the Court specifically did not consider what level of scrutiny, if
any, would be needed for a body cavity or strip search.53 Given
that reasonable suspicion was required for the detention, however, it is improbable that a lower standard would be appropriate.
Courts considering the question after Montoya de Hernandez
have held that reasonable suspicion is required for strip searches
and body cavity searches at the border.54
The general rule from Montoya de Hernandez is that the
reasonableness of a search is determined by balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
governmental interests. 55 What is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment generally "depends upon all of the circumstances
surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search
or seizure itself."56 At the border, however, the test is "qualitatively different" in that the balancing of interests is struck
"much more favorably to the Government."57 This is why routine
border searches are not subject to any requirement of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. 58 In the Court's words, the border
search cases "reflect longstanding concern for the protection of
the integrity of the border."59 And, in this case, the concern was
heightened by the "national crisis" caused by the smuggling of
illegal narcotics. 6o For these reasons, the detention was permissible given that reasonable suspicion was present.

Idat 541.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 US at 534-36.
53 See id at 541 & n 4.
54 See, for example, Tabbaa v Chertoff, 509 F3d 89, 98 (2d Cir 2007) (observing that
strip and body cavity searches generally require reasonable suspicion); United States v
Ramos-Saenz, 36 F3d 59, 61 (9th Cir 1994) (concluding that strip searches at the border
go "beyond the routine"); United States v Johnson, 991 F2d 1287, 1292 (7th Cir 1993)
(noting that strip and body cavity searches are intrusive and "nonroutine").
55 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 US at 537.
56 Id, citing New Jersey v T.L.O., 469 US 325, 337-42 (1985).
57 Montoya de Hernandez,473 US at 538-40.
58 See id.
59 Id at 538.
60 Id.
51

52
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Justice William Brennan, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, filed a vigorous dissent in Montoya de Hernandez. Their
main concern was the humiliating and degrading treatment that
Montoya de Hernandez suffered during her detention.61 They
worried that the reasonable suspicion standard gave "sweeping
and unmonitored authority" to low-level customs officials.62 They
were also interested in tethering the border search exception to
its purpose. Though they believed that the need for wideranging detentions and searches for immigration and customs
control was "unquestioned," they also thought that "far different
considerations apply when detentions and searches are carried
63
out for purposes of investigating suspected criminal activity."
These dissenting justices drew a distinction that is, in some
ways, parallel to limiting conditions that the Court has recognized in other lines of search cases that include exceptions to the
warrant requirement. In Arizona v Gant,64 the Court held that a
vehicle search incident to arrest was proper only to the extent
that it protected officer safety or was likely to produce "evidence
relevant to the crime of arrest.65 Officers were not permitted to
go fishing for evidence of unrelated offenses. Similarly, the
Court has held that roadblocks aimed at "general crime control"
are usually impermissible, whereas those targeting specific
criminal activity, such as drunk driving, are allowed.6 Brennan
could be seen as advocating for a similar standard in the border
search context, requiring that the border search exception be
tightly tethered to the aims of the border search doctrine: controlling "who and what may enter the country.67
C.

Clarification of the Routine/Nonroutine Distinction:
Protection of Privacy and Dignity Interests

Montoya de Hernandez established that certain types of
nonroutine searches, such as detentions for sixteen hours and,
potentially, body cavity and strip searches, require reasonable
See Montoya de Hernandez,473 US at 545-48 (Brennan dissenting).
Id at 549 (Brennan dissenting).
63 Id at 554 (Brennan dissenting) (emphasis and citations omitted).
64
556 US 332 (2009).
65
Id at 343-44.
66 Edmond, 531 US at 47.
67 Ramsey, 431 US at 620. It is somewhat puzzling why the detection of illegal narcotics does not fall into the "immigration and customs control" rationales that Brennan
and Marshall recognize as legitimate. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 US at 554 (Brennan
dissenting).
61

62
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suspicion. The boundaries of the category of nonroutine searches
were very uncertain after that case, however, and the more recent case of Flores-Montano helps to clarify them.68 Here, the
search concerned the contents of a motor vehicle's gas tank. In
the course of the search, the tank assembly was dismantled and
drugs were discovered inside.69 In holding that this search could
be conducted absent reasonable suspicion, the Court focused on
the types of Fourth Amendment interests that Montoya de
Hernandez was meant to protect: the "dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched."70 The Court explained that
71
these interests, however, "simply do not carry over to vehicles."'
In effect, the Court held that nonroutine searches are those that
are highly intrusive to the dignity and privacy interests of those
being searched, and not those that are merely unusual or require
the extensive physical manipulation of the person's property.
This emphasis on privacy and dignity interests makes FloresMontano an easy case. As the Court somewhat humorously noted,
the petitioner's argument was that he had a "privacy interest in
his fuel tank."72 Though a fuel tank is not often open to public
inspection, it is also not the sort of location that the Fourth
Amendment is generally seen as protecting. Vehicles are not
homes and are even less private than one's personal luggage.
The vehicle-search exception cases are based, in part, on this
recognition3 No private, intimate activity occurs in a car's gas
tank, and no licit secrets are commonly stored there.
The innocent also have nothing to fear from a gas tank
search7 As the Court noted, a gas tank should be solely a repository for fuel. 75 No great embarrassment or personal revelations
are risked by subjecting it to search.76 As Justice John Paul

70

See Flores-Montano, 541 US at 152.
Id at 151-52.
Id at 152.

71

Id.

68
69

Flores-Montano, 541 US at 154.
73
See California v Acevedo, 500 US 565, 569-71 (1991) (describing the vehiclesearch exception).
74 For a case in which the Court has indicated that investigative methods that can
reveal only criminal activity are less problematic, see United States v Place, 462 US 696,
707 (1983) (noting that drug-sniffing dogs reveal only contraband, thereby limiting the
information that the government receives and the embarrassment and intrusion experienced by innocent property owners).
75 Flores-Montano,541 US at 154.
76 Indeed, in the empirical survey, participants rated gas tank searches as among
the least revealing of sensitive personal information. See text accompanying notes 199-203.
72
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Stevens noted in Montoya de Hernandez, to allow a search without reasonable suspicion is to accept that a greater share of
innocent people will be subjected to it. 77 Here, those innocent
people would suffer inconvenience, but would not risk having
their secrets publicly revealed or suffer any special humiliation.
The Court noted that some searches of property might be
carried out in a "particularly offensive manner" or be "so destructive" that they should only be permitted given reasonable
suspicion.78 The gas tank search here, however, did not satisfy
either requirement. 79 Therefore the search was routine and did
not require elevated suspicion.
The question in the wake of Flores-Montano is whether the
"dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched" ever
require limitations on searches of property. 0 The Court's holding
that these interests were insufficiently implicated by a vehicle
search could be taken as a conclusion about searches of a specific
type of property or as a general statement about all property
searches.81 Lower court judges trying to apply Flores-Montanoto
searches of electronic devices have differed on this point.82

II. BORDER SEARCHES AND ELECTRONIC DEVICES
Electronic devices pose novel challenges for the border
search doctrine. If laptops are viewed as simply another good
traveling across the border, then the doctrines of Montoya de
Hernandez and Flores-Montano provide little support for requiring any elevated degree of suspicion for their search. Under FloresMontano in particular, the Court seems to limit its concern
about privacy and dignity interests to searches of people, not
things,3 and lower courts have traditionally treated searches of
tangible property as routine and not requiring reasonable suspicion. For example, the Ninth Circuit has, at various times, upheld suspicionless searches of briefcases, purses and pockets,
closed containers, and pictures and film.84
77 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 US at 545 (Stevens concurring) (stating that
even a requirement of reasonable suspicion will still allow for the search of many innocent
people).
78 Flores-Montano, 541 US at 154 n 2, 155-56.
79 See id at 155-56.
80 Id at 152.
81 See id.
82 See notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
83 See Flores-Montano, 541 US at 155-56.
84 See notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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Yet a mobile electronic device is not like a gas tank. Though
the gas tanks of innocent people contain few secrets (what secrets could they hide?), laptops and cell phones may contain office
gossip, prescriptions for antidepressants, records of missed bill
payments, political and religious tracts, and-not to forget the
obvious-pornography. There is a reason why relationshipadvice columnists often receive letters from men and women
who snooped around the phones and computers of their spouses:
there is much to find. Given this, are searches of mobile electronic devices sufficiently damaging that they implicate the
same privacy and dignity interests that the Court sought to protect in Montoya de Hernandez and found lacking in FloresMontano?
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have adopted conflicting
perspectives on this issue. While the Fourth Circuit has treated
laptops like briefcases and luggage, which are generally subject
to suspicionless searches, the Ninth Circuit has instead viewed
them as sui generis, imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement for some searches.85 In reaching these conflicting results,
the circuits have disagreed about whether travelers understand
that their devices can be searched at the border, 86 as well as
whether laptop searches are sufficiently offensive to the privacy
and dignity interests described in Flores-Montano.81 The Cotterman
court, as will be seen below, explicitly grounded its decision on
its understanding of the answers to these questions88
These questions are fundamentally empirical. Either travelers
generally expect these searches, or they do not. Either they feel
that their privacy and dignity interests are especially violated
85 Compare United States v Ickes, 393 F3d 501, 502 (4th Cir 2005) (holding that lawenforcement officials have broad powers to search property at the border), with Cotterman,
709 F3d at 966 (noting that "[r]easonable suspicion is a modest, workable standard" to
apply to border searches of laptops).
86 Compare Ickes, 393 F3d at 506 (observing that an international traveler "should
not be surprised" to have his property searched while crossing the border), with Cotterman,
709 F3d at 967 (observing that, while international travelers expect to have their belongings
searched at the border, "they do not expect [ ] that, absent some particularized suspicion,
agents will mine every last piece of data on their devices or deprive them of their most
personal property for days").
87 Compare Ickes, 393 F3d at 506 (noting that a traveler's expectation of privacy "is
substantially lessened" at the border), with Cotterman, 709 F3d at 966 (noting that "[a]n
exhaustive forensic search of a copied laptop hard drive intrudes upon privacy and dignity
interests to a far greater degree than a cursory search at the border").
88 Cotterman, 709 F3d at 967-68 (citing expectations, intrusiveness, and indignity
as the reasons for its holding, and calling a laptop search a "substantial intrusion upon
personal privacy and dignity").
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by having their electronic devices searched, or they do not.
There are also clear baselines against which the answers to
these questions can be measured. Some searches, like strip
searches, have been held to require reasonable suspicion. 89 Many
other searches have not. The central question, then, is whether
searches of electronic devices are seen as more like strip searches
or more like pat-downs. As described below, courts are deeply
divided on this issue.
A.

The Fourth Circuit's Approach: Electronic Devices as
Unexceptional

In the first federal appellate case in this area, United States
v Ickes,90 the Fourth Circuit did not require reasonable suspicion
to justify the search of a computer at the Canadian border. 91 The
questions before the court were whether the border search statute was broad enough to encompass electronic devices and
whether there was a First Amendment exception for expressive
materials.92 In holding that the search statute in question
(which mentioned "cargo" and "packages") was broad enough to
cover electronic devices, the court noted the long history of border searches and the extremely broad latitude granted by the
Supreme Court in past cases. 93 The Ickes court also rejected the
argument that there should be a First Amendment exception for
94
expressive materials.
In explaining its decision, the court made an empirical claim
about the expectations of travelers at the border. Specifically, it
stated that searches were to be expected in this context. "When
someone approaches a border, he should not be surprised that
'[c]ustoms officers characteristically inspect luggage ...; it is an
old practice and is intimately associated with excluding illegal
articles from the country." ' 95 The court saw no reason why
searches of electronic devices were less expected than any other
type of search.

89 See notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
90 393 F3d 501 (4th Cir 2005).
91 See id at 505.
92 Id at 502. See also 19 USC § 1581(a) (permitting customs officials to investigate
any "person, trunk, package, or cargo on board").
93 See Ickes, 393 F3d at 505-07.
94 See id at 506-07.
95 Id at 506, quoting United States v Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 US 363, 376
(1971) (White) (plurality).

1178

The University of Chicago Law Review

[81:1165

Though the court held that reasonable suspicion was not required, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson argued that, "[a]s a practical
matter, computer searches are most likely to occur where-as
here-the traveler's conduct or the presence of other items in his
possession suggest the need to search further."96 He emphasized
that customs officials simply do not have the resources to search
every computer.9 7 Thus, a high mechanical cost may diminish
the need to also impose a legal barrier.
Importantly, there was no question in the Ickes case that
reasonable suspicion was present. A routine search of Ickes's car
at the border revealed "marijuana seeds, marijuana pipes, and a
copy of a Virginia warrant for Ickes's arrest. [The officers] also
found several albums containing photographs of provocatively
posed prepubescent boys, most nude or semi-nude."98 This alone
would normally raise at least reasonable suspicion that child
pornography would be present on Ickes's electronic devices.99
There was, however, even more evidence. When asked, "Ickes
admitted that stored on the computer were Russian videos of
fourteen and fifteen year-old children engaged in sexual acts."100
Though this case establishes that reasonable suspicion is not
needed for the search of laptops and other electronic devices in
the course of a border search, the agents in this case had not only
reasonable suspicion and probable cause, but a freely given
confession.
It is sometimes said that easy cases make bad law.101 For
the search in Ickes to be invalid, the Fourth Circuit would have
needed to impose a warrant requirement for the search of expressive materials or hold that electronic devices were not covered in the border search statute. Neither holding could easily
be supported by past precedent.102 The outcome of Ickes was
therefore in little doubt. Because the case would not have come out
differently had the law required some elevated level of suspicion,
96 Ickes, 393 F3d at 507.
97 See id.
98 Id at 503.
99 Idat 507.
100 Ickes, 393 F3d at 503.
101 See, for example, Arthur R. Pearce, Theft by False Promises, 101 U Pa L Rev 967,
991 (1953) ('Thus do easy cases make bad law, for when it is obvious that a defendant is
a criminal, it becomes less important how he is convicted, or of what crime.").
102 See Ickes, 393 F3d at 504-05 (observing that "the plain language of the [border
search] statute authorizes expansive border searches"); id at 507 (noting the unlikelihood
that the Supreme Court would create a First Amendment exception for the border search
doctrine).
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it is perhaps unsurprising that the court did not fully consider
the merits of imposing a heightened standard. Absent from this
decision is any discussion of the role of electronic devices in
modern American life, or whether the amount of data held on
electronic devices makes them qualitatively different than briefcases full of papers; the fact that the court chose not to address
these arguments suggests that it rejected them. These factors,
however, would prove central to the Ninth Circuit's consideration of electronic-device searches.
B.

An Affirmation of Ickes: Laptops as Containers

Arguing before the Fourth Circuit, the defendant in Ickes
warned that "any person carrying a laptop computer ...on an
international flight would be subject to a search of the files on
the computer hard drive."103 In ruling against him, Wilkinson
wrote that "[t]his prediction seems far-fetched. Customs agents
have neither the time nor the resources to search the contents of
104
every computer."'
When the Ninth Circuit first addressed border searches of
electronic devices, the case before it involved an apparently random search of an international air traveler's laptop.105 Wilkinson
was correct that customs agents do not have the resources to
search every laptop, but he was mistaken if he believed that customs agents would not still search some laptops without cause.
In United States v Arnold,106 the agent began with a cursory examination of Arnold's laptop. "When the computer had booted
up, its desktop displayed numerous icons and folders. Two folders
were entitled 'Kodak Pictures' and one was entitled 'Kodak
Memories.' [The agents] clicked on the Kodak folders, opened the
files, and viewed the photos on Arnold's computer including one
that depicted two nude women."'107 Though the government did
not argue that these pictures depicted minors,1os Arnold was
nevertheless detained for several hours as his laptop was
searched. The agents eventually found child pornography.109

Id at 506-07.
Id at 507.
105 United States v Arnold, 533 F3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir 2008) (noting that the district
court found that the search was random).
106 533 F3d 1003 (9th Cir 2008).
107 Id at 1005.
108 United States v Arnold, 454 F Supp 2d 999, 1001 & n 1 (CD Cal 2006).
109 Arnold, 533 F3d at 1005.
103
104
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Though the Ninth Circuit would later adopt some measure
of protection against laptop searches,110 in this case it followed
the Fourth Circuit's example, holding that the search did not require reasonable suspicion."i Foreshadowing the questions it
would address in Cotterman,112 however, the court in Arnold
considered the argument that academic commentators often
raise about laptop searches: that a laptop is "like the 'human
mind' because of its ability to record ideas, e-mail, internet chats
and web-surfing habits."113 The defendant in Arnold attempted
to analogize laptops to homes, particularly citing the number of
personal documents likely to be stored on them and the number
of secrets that could be revealed by searching them.114 The court
rejected these points, instead viewing laptops merely as closed
containers. The court noted that "searches of closed containers
and their contents can be conducted at the border without particularized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment."115 Though
laptops may contain substantial personal and expressive material,
the court saw no reason to differentiate their search from any of
the other searches that the Ninth Circuit had previously approved absent reasonable suspicion. These permissible searches
included: "(1) the contents of a traveler's briefcase and luggage;
(2) a traveler's 'purse, wallet, or pockets'; (3) papers found in
containers such as pockets (allowing search without particularized suspicion of papers found in a shirt pocket); and (4) pictures, films and other graphic materials."116
Because laptops were not special in the eyes of the Arnold
court, the analysis focused on a literal interpretation of the test
for property searches that was endorsed by the Supreme Court
in Flores-Montano.117 A search of property could require reasonable
suspicion if it either caused "exceptional damage to property" or
was carried out in a "particularly offensive manner."118 But neither exception applied here: the behavior of the customs agents

110 See Part II.C.
111 See Arnold, 533 F3d at 1008 ("Reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs
officials to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices at the border.").
112 See Part II.C.
113 Arnold, 533 F3d at 1006. For examples of such scholarly commentary, see notes 6, 18.
114 See Arnold, 533 F3d at 1006.
115 Id at 1007.
116 Id (citations omitted).
117

See Part I.C.

I1s Arnold, 533 F3d at 1008-09.
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appeared to have been professional, and the laptop itself was
undamaged.119
Arguably, though, the Ninth Circuit missed the central
point of the Flores-Montanoholding. Consider again that FloresMontano involved the search of a car's gas tank. The Supreme
Court specifically noted that no private materials were likely to
be stored in such a container and that the privacy and dignity
interests of the searched party were not implicated by allowing a
search of that area. 120 The same cannot be said of a laptop
search.121 This alternative interpretation of Flores-Montano was
at the core of the district court's contrary ruling.122
C.

The Ninth Circuit, Revisited

In a self-described "watershed case," the Ninth Circuit revisited the border search doctrine in Cotterman.123 Cotterman was
entering the United States from Mexico.124 His name was flagged
based on a fifteen-year-old conviction for child molestation and,
with relatively minimal additional cause for suspicion, his laptop was searched.125 The agents conducted a cursory examination of the laptop, as in Arnold, but initially found nothing of
concern. 126 The laptop was then shipped almost 170 miles away
and subjected to a comprehensive forensic examination.127 Only
then were images of child pornography discovered.128 Initial
analysis found seventy-five images of child pornography within
the unallocated space of Cotterman's laptop.129 Many of the images showed Cotterman sexually molesting children.130 The court
analyzed whether the escalation from a cursory examination at
the border to a forensic examination off-site should have required

119 See id.

120 Flores-Montano, 541 US at 154-56.
121 See Part III.D.1.
122 See Arnold, 454 F Supp 2d at 1003-04 (noting that "[pleople keep all types of
personal information on computers" and that "opening and viewing confidential computer
files implicates dignity and privacy interests").
123 Cotterman, 709 F3d at 956.
124 Id at 957.

125 See id at 957-58.
126 Id.
127 Cotterman, 709 F3d at 958.
12s Id.
129

Id.

130 Id at 959.
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reasonable suspicion and whether reasonable suspicion was
present.131
The majority's analysis in Cotterman stressed the limitations in the border search doctrine. Citing Montoya de Hernandez,
the majority stated that "[e]ven at the border, individual privacy
rights are not abandoned but '[b]alanced against the sovereign's
interests."'' 132 Citing Flores-Montano, it emphasized the need to
consider the "dignity and privacy interests of the person being
searched," as well as the problems with searches of property
that are destructive, particularly offensive, or overly intrusive as
carried out. 133 Despite drawing on the same case law as the prior
decisions, this choice of focus presented a starkly different picture of the border search doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit then adopted much the same reasoning
that it had rejected in Arnold. It stated that a laptop search
"directly implicat[es] substantial personal privacy interests. The
private information individuals store on digital devices-their
personal 'papers' in the words of the Constitution-stands in
stark contrast to the generic and impersonal contents of a gas
tank."'134 Drawing on original intent, the court noted the express
listing of "papers" in the Fourth Amendment and explained that
this "reflects the Founders' deep concern with safeguarding the
privacy of thoughts and ideas-what we might call freedom of
conscience-from invasion by the government."'13
The court was also concerned about violating the expectations of ordinary travelers. It stated that "[i]nternational travelers
certainly expect that their property will be searched at the border. What they do not expect is that, absent some particularized
suspicion, agents will mine every last piece of data on their devices or deprive them of their most personal property for
days."136 As in Ickes,'13 the court here made an empirical claim
about what ordinary people expect and assigned legal significance to its assumptions.

See Cotterman, 709 F3d at 957.
Id at 960, quoting Montoya de Hernandez, 473 US at 539.
133 Cotterman, 709 F3d at 963, quoting Flores-Montano, 541 US at 152.
134 Cotterman, 709 F3d at 964.
135 Id, quoting United States v Seljan, 547 F3d 993, 1014 (9th Cir 2008) (Kozinski
dissenting). It is unclear why, if the listing of "papers" is of great importance, the listing
of "effects" is not.
136 Cotterman, 709 F3d at 967.
137 See Ickes, 393 F3d at 506-07.
131

132
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Despite tacitly adopting the Arnold defendant's take on the
importance of electronic devices, the Ninth Circuit did not overrule that decision. It determined that "the legitimacy of the initial search of Cotterman's [laptop was] not in doubt."138 Rather,
only the "comprehensive and intrusive" forensic examination
that followed triggered a reasonable suspicion requirement.119
This was due to the especially intrusive nature of the forensic
analysis. The majority likened it to "reading a diary line by line
looking for mention of criminal activity-plus looking at everything the writer may have erased."140 The court noted that:
Computer forensic examination is a powerful tool capable of
unlocking password-protected files, restoring deleted material,
and retrieving images viewed on web sites. But while technology may have changed the expectation of privacy to some
degree, it has not eviscerated it, and certainly not with respect
to the gigabytes of data regularly maintained as private and
confidential on digital devices.141
According to the court, this was "essentially a computer strip
search. An exhaustive forensic search of a copied laptop hard
drive intrudes upon privacy and dignity interests to a far greater
degree than a cursory search at the border."142
This argument is similar to the concern raised in Entick v
Carrington143 and Wilkes v Wood44 about the evils of giving officials wide discretion to search private papers (though those cases
are not named in Cotterman).145 The Fourth Amendment was
created, in part, to prevent the state from having the power to
conduct a general fishing expedition into a person's private papers

Cotterman, 709 F3d at 960.
139 Id at 962.
140 Id at 962-63.
141 Id at 957.
142 Cotterman, 709 F3d at 966.
143 95 Eng Rep 807, 817-18 (KB 1765) (holding that the monarchy's use of general
warrants to search the plaintiffs private papers constituted trespass, "for papers are often
the dearest property a man can have").
144 98 Eng Rep 489, 498 (KB 1763) (noting that if the state is empowered to use general warrants to seize private property without specifying what property has been taken, or
even a suspect's name, that power "is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject").
145 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance,
30 Suffolk U L Rev 53, 65-67 (1996) (describing how the Fourth Amendment was in part a
response to the excesses of general warrants in the English cases of Entick and Wilkes).
138
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and effects.146 In the eyes of the majority, this extensive border
search eviscerated the target's privacy interests.147
1. Adapting doctrine to account for changes in technology.
The Cotterman court believed that existing border search
doctrine needed to be updated to account for the effects of changes
in technology.'4 As support for this type of doctrinal tailoring, the
court cited Kyllo v United States,149 which held that government
monitoring of a home's heat signature is a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 150 Prior to the development
of thermal-imaging devices, no one would have thought that
monitoring heat would amount to a privacy violation. Given
what technology had made possible by the beginning of the
twenty-first century, however, such signals could be used to peer
within the private space of the home. The majority in Cotterman
believed that this presented a parallel case: the intrusiveness of a
search of one's traveling possessions had previously been small but,
with the rise of mobile computing, had increased substantially. 151
First, the majority was concerned with the sheer amount of
information carried.52 Though a person might select a few files
out of a cabinet to carry in a briefcase, the laptop carries the entire filing cabinet, if not the entire office. This contributes to the
further problem that one does not select the files that one carries
on a laptop in the same way that one selects the papers that one
puts in a briefcase. This is particularly worrisome in cases in
which deleted files are recovered. Then it becomes prohibitively
difficult to not carry a file if one does not have the resources to
have a separate traveling laptop or phone. People therefore often
cannot make meaningful decisions about what they are exposing
to potential search.53
The type of information involved in electronic-device searches
also presented a problem. The majority referred to "[1]aptop
computers, iPads and the like" as being "simultaneously offices
146 See id. See also generally James Otis, Against the Writs of Assistance (1761), in
Melvin I. Urofsky and Paul Finkelman, eds, Documents of American Constitutional &
Legal History Volume I: From the Founding to 1896 38 (Oxford 3d ed 2008).
147 See Cotterman, 709 F3d at 957.
148 See id at 956-57.
149 533 US 27 (2001).
150 Id at 40.
151 See Cotterman, 709 F3d at 965.
152 See id at 964.
153 See id at 965.
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and personal diaries. They contain the most intimate details of
our lives: financial records, confidential business documents,
medical records and private emails."'154 In short, highly revealing
and embarrassing information. This is far beyond what would
normally be found in a briefcase. 155 The Supreme Court recently
recognized the force of this argument in Riley, noting that cell
phones often contain "a broad array of private information never
found in a home in any form-unless the phone is."156
Though it was not at issue in this case, the Cotterman court
also commented on a problem that often arises in cell phone
searches. One common use of laptops and smartphones is to access
data stored "in the cloud." For example, consider one's Gmail
account. Comparatively little data related to the account is
stored on the computer itself; most is on Google's servers. But
the laptop or smartphone is a "key" to the file store. The Cotterman
court described using a mobile electronic device as "akin to the
key to a safe deposit box."'1 7 This raises two problems. First is
the aforementioned issue of choosing the files that one brings. If
one's laptop has been used to access Google, Amazon, Facebook,
and the like, it may be possible to recover those passwords with
a forensic examination. The potential for privacy intrusion is
therefore vast.
A further problem with searches of data in the cloud is that
the "virtual safe deposit box" does not itself cross the border.
Though from the customs agent's perspective he has merely
tapped the mail icon on a traveler's phone, he has actually asked
the phone to communicate with servers located all over the
world.158 Customs agents searching smartphones apparently
regularly open apps, 159 so this is not a purely academic concern.
Because "[s]uch a thorough and detailed search of the
most intimate details of one's life is a substantial intrusion
Id at 964.
Participants in this Comment's survey believe that more would be exposed by
search of their personal electronic devices than by searches of their other luggage. See
Table 2.
156 Riley, No 13-132, slip op at 21.
157 Cotterman, 709 F3d at 965.
158 See id.
159 See Abidor v Napolitano, 2013 WL 6912654, *15-19 (EDNY) (holding that customs
agents had reasonable suspicion to search the personal computer files of an Islamic studies
graduate student whose laptop contained images of terrorist-organization rallies). See
also Patrick E. Corbett, The Future of the Fourth Amendment in a DigitalEvidence Context: Where Would the Supreme Court Draw the Electronic Line at the InternationalBorder?, 81 Miss L J 1263, 1266-68 (2012) (describing the Abidor case).
154
155
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upon personal privacy and dignity," the Cotterman court held
that a showing of reasonable suspicion was necessary in the context of forensic examinations of computers, calling it "a modest
requirement in light of the Fourth Amendment."160
2. In the concurrence and dissent, endorsements of Ickes.
Judges Consuelo Callahan and Milan Smith wrote strong
opinions that took issue with the new reasonable suspicion requirement. Callahan concurred in the judgment-the majority
found reasonable suspicion and held that the evidence was admissible-but sharply disagreed with requiring elevated suspicion for any search of an electronic device at the border.161 Smith
dissented because he would have held that the search amounted
to an "extended border search," which would require reasonable
suspicion regardless of what was being searched, and he did not
think that reasonable suspicion was present here.162 Despite disagreeing on the appropriate disposition of the case, both judges
raised the same types of concerns about the new reasonable suspicion rule. Callahan focused on the "person" language from loresMontano, stating that highly intrusive searches of things should
not require reasonable suspicion unless they are either destructive or offensively conducted.163 Smith similarly would have held
that reasonable suspicion should be required at the border only
for "highly intrusive searches of the person" and searches of
property that are destructive or carried out in an offensive manner.164 In adopting this interpretation, Callahan and Smith revisited the now-familiar tension over the meaning of FloresMontano: Are the dignity and privacy interests that make some
searches of the body worrisome never implicated in searches of
property, or were they merely not implicated in that case's
search of a gas tank?
Smith also attacked the majority's main premise that computers are intensely private. He pointed out that people regularly
160
161

Cotterman, 709 F3d at 968.
See id at 971 (Callahan concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in

the judgment).
162 Id at 989 (Smith dissenting). Smith's dissent also pointed out that the majority
had to make some fairly convoluted assumptions to find reasonable suspicion in this
case. See id at 990-93 (Smith dissenting). Again, it should be remembered that the class
of defendants bringing these computer-search cases is typically highly unsympathetic.
163 See id at 973 (Callahan concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment).
164 Cotterman, 709 F3d at 982 (Smith dissenting).
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share sensitive personal information on the Internet, arguing
that, "[i]ronically, the majority creates a zone of privacy in electronic devices at the border that is potentially greater than that
afforded the Google searches we perform in our own homes, and
elsewhere."15 If people take no pains to keep online activity private from Google, why should searches by customs agents be
limited? Callahan was similarly unconcerned. To her, "electronic
devices are like any other container" and should be subject to
search on the same grounds.166
Both Smith and Callahan also specifically rejected the argument that the quantity of data stored in electronic devices
should change the analysis. According to Smith, "The documents
carried on today's smart phones and laptops are different only in
form, but not in substance, from yesterday's papers, carried in
briefcases and wallets."167 And "[u]nder the majority's reasoning,
the mere process of digitalizing our diaries and work documents
somehow increases the 'sensitive nature' of the data therein,
providing travelers with a greater expectation of privacy in a diary
that happens to be produced on an iPad rather than a legal
pad."168 The majority argued that size mattered, increasing the
magnitude of the privacy invasion, but Callahan and Smith saw
no basis in the doctrine for that conclusion.69
D. The State of the Law
To date, it appears that no defendant challenging a border
search of an electronic device has ever won suppression based on
a lack of reasonable suspicion.170 Some courts have explicitly held
reasonable suspicion irrelevant to the more routine computer

165 Id at 986 (Smith dissenting) (noting that 500 million people are members of
Facebook and that Internet cookies, which track browsing activity, are ubiquitous).
166 Id at 976 (Callahan concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
167 Id at 987 (Smith dissenting). Callahan expressed a similar sentiment. See id at
977-78 (Callahan concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
168 Cotterman, 709 F3d at 987 (Smith dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
169 See id (Smith dissenting); id at 977-78 (Callahan concurring in part, dissenting
in part, and concurring in the judgment).
170 See Corbett, 81 Miss L J at 1269-74 (cited in note 159). In his review of lower
and appellate court decisions on border searches of electronic devices, Professor Patrick
Corbett finds fifteen cases, fourteen of which concern child pornography, which were decided over a five-year period. The only appellate case described, apart from the Fourth
and Ninth Circuit decisions, is United States v Irving, 452 F3d 110 (2d Cir 2006). In that
case, the court did not decide whether a search of 3.5-inch computer disks was routine or
nonroutine because the search was supported by reasonable suspicion. See id at 124.
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searches at issue in particular cases. 171 Others have found reason72
able suspicion and not determined whether it was necessary.
This does not appear to have changed in the brief time since
the Cotterman decision. In an extremely short opinion, one lower
court held that, even if it were inclined to adopt Cotterman's
reasonable suspicion requirement, the search before it was not
comprehensive and intrusive enough to trigger it.173 A more ex174
tensive and much-anticipated opinion in Abidor v Napolitano
reached a similar result, holding that reasonable suspicion was
17
present, rendering moot the question whether it was required. 5
That case concerned a challenge to Department of Homeland
Security directives that authorize the search of electronic devices
at border crossings.176 In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized that travelers know that their electronic devices are at
risk of both search and theft and therefore would be wise to
choose carefully what files they carry with them.177
The most important recent development in this area is the
Supreme Court's decision in Riley, which was strongly protective
of individuals' privacy interests in electronic devices in the context of searches incident to arrest. 178 That opinion did not directly
discuss border searches, but it is extremely likely that the next
round of border cases will grapple with the Court's willingness
to write special rules for electronic devices in the arrest context.
Given that border search doctrine is ripe for reevaluation, the
persuasiveness of the border-specific elements of the Cotterman
analysis is of immediate importance.

171 See, for example, United States v Stewart, 729 F3d 517, 521-24 (6th Cir 2013)
(holding that a reasonable suspicion inquiry is inapplicable to a laptop search that involved using the image-preview function to view thumbnails of photographs).
172 See, for example, United States v Rogozin, 2010 WL 4628520, *3-4 (WDNY) (determining that reasonable suspicion was present because the accused avoided eye contact
during the interview with a border agent and had a questionable itinerary); United
States v Verma, 2010 WL 1427261, *4 (SD Tex) (noting that the investigating agents
possessed "the requisite particularized and objective basis" to have reasonable suspicion
of Verma's wrongdoing).
173 See United States v Wallace, 2013 WL 1702791, *1 (ND Ga) (noting that the intrusion in the instant case was not as intrusive as the search in Cotterman).
174 2013 WL 6912654 (EDNY).
175 See id at *18.
176 Id at *1.
177 See id at *13-14.
178 See Riley, No 13-132, slip op at 17-21.
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III. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF LAY ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS
As shown in Part II, courts have speculated about the role of
electronic devices in daily life, the kinds of treatment that citizens expect when crossing the national border, and the degree of
intrusion represented by searches of electronic devices. Consistent with the instruction in Flores-Montano to consider the
privacy and dignity interests of the person being searched,179
courts have, in part, based their rulings on these impressions.180
But none of these cases, and little of the secondary literature,
has cited empirical data on citizens' privacy expectations and
the degree of intrusion caused by searches of electronic devices.
In the absence of empirical data, judges have had to guess at the
background social facts even though those facts are highly relevant to their decisions. As was seen in the argument between
the majority and the dissent in Cotterman about the degree of
security that individuals have and expect in their electronic
communications, 181 not all judges have arrived at the same set of
answers. As judges and justices are now weighing whether to
follow the Cotterman court in treating electronic devices as special, it would be helpful to determine how much everyday people
know about searches of electronic devices and how they feel
about those searches.
A.

Past Work on the Perceived Intrusiveness of Searches

There is a limited amount of prior empirical work analyzing
privacy attitudes in the context of police searches, much of it by
Professors Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher. In the
early 1990s, Slobogin and Schumacher conducted a survey asking a sample of students to rate the perceived intrusiveness of
various types of searches drawn from controversial Fourth
Amendment cases. 182 They found that a body cavity search (conducted at the border) was judged to be the most intrusive. A
search of a bedroom, reading a personal diary, and monitoring a

See Flores-Montano, 541 US at 152.
See notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
181 See Cotterman, 709 F3d at 986 (Smith dissenting) (commenting that individuals
regularly convey to Google the very sensitive personal information that is at issue in
electronic searches).
182 Christopher Slobogin and Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in FourthAmendment Cases:An Empirical Look at "Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 Duke L J 727, 737 (1993).
179

180
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phone for thirty days were seen as only slightly less intrusive.183
Unfortunately, the researchers included only two border scenarios,
the body cavity search and a pat-down, and-as is to be expected
given that the paper was published in 1993-did not probe atti84
tudes toward the search of personal computers.
This study was recently replicated by Professor Jeremy
Blumenthal, Doctor Meera Adya, and Jacqueline Mogle.185 Their
results largely tracked those of Slobogin and Schumacher, with
some minor differences. They found, for example, that reading a
personal diary was now perceived to be the most intrusive
search, and that perusing bank records, tapping a corporation's
computer network, and searching a bedroom were all more intrusive than the body cavity search.186 The scenarios used in this
study were the same as in Slobogin and Schumacher's study, so
they do not bear specifically on border searches of mobile electronic devices. The results are suggestive, however. They show
that people can plausibly be expected to view searches of electronic devices as being as intrusive as body cavity and strip
searches-the kinds of searches that Montoya de Hernandez
suggested would likely require elevated suspicion.187 Consider
the personal diary example. Like the mobile electronic device, a
diary can be searched without harm to it or physical contact
with the person. But, again like the mobile device, searching a
diary could reveal the most intimate secrets of the person.
These studies have some shared limitations. Though some
of the scenarios are suggestive of views toward searches of electronic devices, no scenario is closely on point. The studies also
used samples of students, and even the more recent of the studies
used the same search scenarios that were written for the 1993
survey. The dependent measure was also somewhat limited.
Slobogin and Schumacher had their participants rate "intrusiveness,"'188 and the replication study followed their example189
Professor Orin Kerr has argued that this is not the best term.
He believes that the term "intrusive suggests interference with
183 See id at 738-39.
184 See id.
185 See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meera Adya, and Jacqueline Mogle, The Multiple
Dimensions of Privacy: Testing Lay "Expectations of Privacy," 11 U Pa J Const L 331,
341-43 (2009).
186 See id at 359.
187 See text accompanying notes 53-54.
188 Slobogin and Schumacher, 42 Duke L J at 735-37 (cited in note 182).
189 See Blumenthal, Adya, and Mogle, 11 U Pa J Const L at 345 (cited in note 185).
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the status quo. The more intrusive something is, the more it alters
the world that existed before. As a result, police techniques that
are common, are expected, or go unnoticed will tend to seem unintrusive.' 190 Similarly, that which is uncommon or unexpected
will seem more intrusive. But merely because something is uncommon does not mean that it violates civil liberties (and merely
because it is common does not mean that it does not).191 Because
of this concern, I employ a wider range of dependent measures.
B.

Participants

A sample of 300 adults living in the United States was recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk service.192 The resulting
set of respondents was diverse, if not representatively weighted.
Ten participants were excluded for having completion times that
were less than half that of the median participant, and a further
five were eliminated because they reported that they were not
US citizens, leaving 285 participants. Of the remaining sample,
the median age was 35 (range 18-74, M = 37.56, SD = 12.77).
54.7 percent of the sample was female, 46.7 percent held a valid
passport, and 71.6 percent had traveled outside the United
States at some point. According to the State Department, in
2013 there were 117.4 million passports in circulation for 316.1
million Americans (37.2 percent),193 making the sample more

travel ready than the national population as a whole. The sample
was also somewhat better educated, with a greater proportion of
participants holding four-year college degrees. 194 85.6 percent of
190

Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 Mich L Rev 951, 958

(2009).
191 See id at 959.

192 For a description of Mechanical Turk's use as a data-collection tool, see generally
Michael Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang, and Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon's Mechanical Turk:
A New Source of Inexpensive, yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 Persp Psychological Sci 3 (2011).
It is commonly used in the social sciences and in law as a means of low-cost data collection. See, for example, David A. Hoffman and Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of
Contract Precautions,80 U Chi L Rev 395, 410 (2013); Stuart P. Green and Matthew B,
Kugler, Public Perceptions of White Collar Crime Culpability: Bribery, Perjury, and
Fraud,75 L & Contemp Probs 33, 42 (2012).
193 Bureau of Consular Affairs, Valid Passportsin Circulation(1989-Present), online
at http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/passports/statistics.html (visited Aug
12, 2014); US Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts (Mar 27, 2014), online at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (visited Aug 12, 2014).
194 In the sample, 12.6 percent of participants had graduate degrees, 36.8 percent
had four-year college degrees, 20.4 percent had two-year degrees, 28.8 percent had high
school degrees, and 1.4 percent had not completed high school. According to the US Census
Bureau, 13.5 percent of those aged 35-39 have graduate degrees, a further 22.5 percent
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the sample identified as white, 6.7 percent was black, and 5.3
percent was South or East Asian.
C.

Types of Searches

Each participant was asked to evaluate twenty-six different
types of searches. Thirteen of the described searches involved
electronic devices and thirteen did not. The searches without
electronic devices were presented first, in random order. Then
the electronic searches were presented, again in random order.
The searches were presented in the following form:
"When a person is seeking to enter the United States,
whether it is at an airport or a land crossing, imagine a border
agent wanted to: [one of the below was inserted here]"
* Ask the traveler to fill out a customs form asking them
to state all the major purchases abroad that they are
trying to bring back into the country.
" Ask the traveler where they have been traveling and
what they did there.
* Fingerprint the traveler.
* Have a drug-sniffing dog walk around the traveler's
car.*195
* Open the traveler's briefcase or backpack and read any
papers that might be inside.
* Open the traveler's briefcase or backpack to check
whether it contains drugs, but not to read any papers
that might be inside.
* Pat down the traveler.
* Perform a body cavity search on the traveler.
* Put the traveler's car up on a jack and check the gas
tank for contraband.*
* Read the traveler's diary, found in their shoulder bag.
* Search the traveler's car for any packages they might
be carrying and open the packages.*
* Strip search the traveler.

have four-year degrees, 10.5 percent have two-year degrees, 42.2 percent have a high
school degree but have not completed any college degree, and 11.3 percent do not have a
high school degree. See US Census Bureau, Educational Attainment in the United
States: 2013 - Detailed Tables, online at http://www.census.govlhhes/socdemo/education/
datalcps/2013/tables.html (visited Aug 12, 2014).
195 For those scenarios marked with an asterisk, the text asked participants to picture
only a land crossing instead of an airport or land crossing.

2014]

Searching Electronic Devices at the Border

1193

*

Take the traveler's car to a location 90 minutes away
and have a drug-sniffing dog walk around it.*
"The following questions concern the search of various electronic devices, such as cellphones, laptops, and tablets. When a
person is seeking to enter the United States, whether it is at an
airport or a land crossing, imagine a border agent wanted to:
[one of the below was inserted here]"196
* Dismantle the traveler's device to inspect the inside,
assuming that it can be reassembled without damage.
* Power on the traveler's device.
• Review the traveler's most recently opened documents
and applications.
* Search the traveler's device for a list of most recent
calls.
• Search the traveler's device for the 10 most recent text
messages.
* Search the traveler's device's browser for a list of recent searches.
* Search the traveler's entire picture archive.
* Search the traveler's entire text message history.
* Subject the traveler's device to a forensic examination
to recover any files that the traveler may have deleted,
including pictures, documents, and emails.
* Use the traveler's device to access the traveler's email
account and search their emails.
* Use the traveler's device to log on to the traveler's
Facebook account.
* Use the traveler's device to read the traveler's electronic diary.
* Use the traveler's device's saved passwords to log on to
other websites, like Amazon or eBay, to examine recent purchases.
D.

Procedures and Results

After agreeing to participate in the study, respondents were
told that they would be asked to evaluate a series of searches occurring at the national border. Before rating any searches, participants were also told that:

196

Other than the preamble, this is the same prompt as before.
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Whether they are a citizen returning from abroad or a tourist from another country, a person can be searched when
they cross the border into the United States. . . . Some
[search] methods can be used on any traveler, regardless of
whether they have done anything to make the border
guards suspicious. Others can only be used if the traveler
seems shifty or appears to be hiding something.
For each of the twenty-six searches in the study, participants were asked four questions. The first three questions, answered on scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very), asked
participants to rate how intrusive the search was (mirroring
Slobogin and Schumacher), how likely the search was to reveal
sensitive personal information, and how embarrassing the
search would be. The two new questions were intended to address the privacy and dignity concerns, respectively, that were
cited in Flores-Montano.197 The final question for each search
asked participants whether the government could conduct this
search on "any traveler they choose," "[o]nly if they can give a
particular reason to suspect the specific traveler of criminal activity" (intended to capture the meaning of reasonable suspicion),

or "[o]nly if they have a warrant from a

judge."198

1. Intrusiveness, sensitive information, embarrassment,
and expectations.
Data on each of the three continuous measures were analyzed using within-subjects ANOVAs with Bonferroni-corrected
pairwise comparisons.199 The results are presented in Table 1.
The most severe of the electronic searches are seen as nearly as
intrusive as body cavity and strip searches. Five electronic
searches, including the forensic analysis from Cotterman and
the reading of an entire text message archive, are seen as significantly more intrusive than all of the traditional searches other
than those two body searches. Every electronic search that
See Flores-Montano,541 US at 152.
At the very end of the study, participants were also invited to make free-response
comments. The second epigraph is from that inquiry.
199 To avoid a multiple-comparison issue, Bonferroni corrections were used for the
pairwise tests. This highly conservative choice likely obscures some meaningful differences among the scenarios. Null effects should be interpreted with caution.
Unsurprisingly, scores on each of the three measures differed significantly across scenarios. Intrusiveness: F(25, 3131.50) = 353.08, p < .001 r12= .55; Reveal information:
F(25, 2894.55) = 219.79, p < .001 r 2 = .44; F(25, 3534.69) = 248.44, p < .001 r12 = .47. Due
to sphericity violations, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were used for all three analyses.
197
19s
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accessed the contents of the device was seen as significantly
more intrusive than reading the papers in a traveler's briefcase-the analogy drawn in the Cotterman dissent.200 All electronic searches, except merely turning the device on, were seen
as more intrusive than the search of the inside of a car's gas
tank (which does not require reasonable suspicion under FloresMontan0201). Effectively, the electronic searches divide into those
that are like a body cavity search, those that are like reading a
person's personal diary, and those that are like the ninetyminute-drug-dog sniff search at issue in United States v Place.202
The single exception is turning the device on to see whether it
works.
The four searches seen as most revealing of private information all involve electronic devices. If we set aside reading
one's (physical) diary as being somewhat sui generis, the top ten
most revealing searches are all of one's electronic devices.
The embarrassment ratings are consistent with the other
two measures. As one might expect, the body cavity and strip
searches are clearly distinct from all other possible searches.
Following these, however, are reading a person's personal diary
and a range of electronic searches (of the e-mail account, the text
archive, the deleted files, and the picture archive), all of which
are statistically and practically impossible to distinguish from
one another. The list of recent calls is the least embarrassing of
the content-related electronic searches.
Though greatly concerned about the embarrassment and
privacy violation of electronic-device searches, ordinary citizens
appear to believe that they are protected from them, even at
border crossings. In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit worried that
forensic analysis of electronic devices would violate the expectations of travelers, while the Fourth Circuit in Ickes believed that
travelers would not be surprised.23 The judges in Cotterman
were more correct than they likely realized. For the majority of
electronic searches, including those that even the Cotterman
court would have considered routine, less than 11 percent of
participants believed that border agents could conduct the
search without at least some articulable suspicion. For only
See Cotterman, 709 F3d at 987 (Smith dissenting).
See Flores-Montano,541 US at 155-56.
202 462 US 696, 709 (1983) (holding that a ninety-minute detention to allow for a
200
201

drug-dog sniff search exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry stop).
203 Compare Cotterman, 709 F3d at 967, with Ickes, 393 F3d at 506.
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one content-related electronic search did a majority of participants believe that the search could be conducted without a warrant from a judge. For that single exception-a search of the recent call list-49.47 percent of participants still believed that a
warrant was required. Interestingly, the overwhelming majority
of participants recognized that the most commonly used search
techniques (pat-down, questioning about travel plans, drugsniffing dogs, and opening luggage) could be conducted on any
traveler even without articulable cause. The views of the participants therefore track reality to a substantial degree in the context of traditional searches. Also interesting is that searching
the inside of a gas tank was believed to require reasonable suspicion but not a warrant, contra the decision in Flores-Montano
holding that reasonable suspicion was not required.
Consider the reasonable suspicion standard in the context of
these data. Were content-related searches of electronic devices
to be permitted absent reasonable suspicion, this policy would
allow without-cause searches that (1) are seen as among the
most intrusive contemplated or recorded in the current case law,
(2) are the most revealing of sensitive information, (3) are only
less embarrassing than strip searches and body cavity searches,
and (4) would surprise more than 85 percent of respondents. In
terms of the Flores-Montano dignity and privacy criteria, this
would be a perverse result.
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TABLE 1A. RATINGS OF TRADITIONAL SEARCHES, SORTED BY
PERCEIVED INTRUSIVENESS
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TABLE lB. RATINGS OF ELECTRONIC SEARCHES, SORTED BY
PERCEIVED INTRUSIVENESS
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2. Extent of revelation.
When considering whether the contents of electronic devices
should be protected from searches, courts may want to know
what types of information such searches are likely to reveal.
Particularly, they may wish to know what types of information
are revealed to a greater extent by searches of electronic devices
than by more traditional searches. After completing their ratings
of the various searches, participants were therefore asked to
think about the types of information available on their electronic
devices. They were given a list of information types and, for
each, were asked to check whether that type of information
could be found on their device. These types of information were:
recent purchases, banking information, information about the
personal lives of friends and family, romantic interests or sex
life, interest in pornography, credit history, income level, ideological beliefs, educational records, sensitive medical information, and medical prescriptions. Participants were then asked
to think about the other things that they travel with and to rate
how much someone searching their electronic devices would
learn on a scale from 1 ("[n]o more than from my other possessions") to 5 ("[m]uch more than from my other possessions")
about each information type.
TABLE 2. WHETHER MORE CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE SEARCH
OF THE TRAVELER'S ELECTRONIC DEVICES THAN FROM OTHER
POSSESSIONS
Type of Information

Info
Present

Recent Purchases
Banking
Family Information
Romantic Life
Pornography

82%
76%
76%
55%
45%

Credit
Income
Ideology
Educational Records
Medical
Prescriptions
*p < .05; **p <.01; ***p

42%
41%
40%
35%
28%
24%
<.001

Learn How Much More
from Electronic Search?
3.58 (1.46)
3.41 (1.56)
3.51 (1.41)
2.89 (1.56)
2.59 (1.71)
2.63 (1.58)
2.60 (1.45)
2.53 (1.46)
2.35 (1.48)
1.98 (1.35)
1.93 (1.37)

t(284)=29.87**
t(284)=26.09***
t(284)=29.93***
t(283)=20.49***
t(282)=15.59***
t(282)=17.39***
t(283)=18.52***
t(282)=17.60***
t(284)=15.36***
t(283)=12.23-**
t(284)=11.43***
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Participants reported that a search of their electronic devices
would yield more information about all of the topic domains
than would a search of their other belongings. Generally, participants felt that their electronic devices would be most revealing
of their recent purchases, banking, and information about family
and friends, but also believed that their romantic lives and interests in pornography could be exposed.
3. Correlates of privacy concern.
An additional question concerns the demographic and ideological correlates of privacy concern in the context of border
searches. Is concern about border searches concentrated among
particular subsets of the population, or is it felt equally across
different demographic groups? The survey instrument included
a number of items intended to address this topic. Participants
were asked to report their age and educational attainment as
part of their demographic information.04 They also rated how
liberal or conservative they are-(1) overall, (2) on economic issues,
and (3) on social issues--on a scale ranging from 1 ("Very Liberal")
to 7 ("Very Conservative").
It is also interesting to analyze whether those concerned
about searches of electronic devices at the border are concerned
with privacy more generally. The study therefore included a
measure of consumer-informational privacy concern that was
commonly used by Professor Alan Westin.205 Participants rated
how much they agreed or disagreed with three statements on a
scale ranging from 1 ("Disagree Very Strongly") to 4 ("Agree
Very Strongly"). The statements were: (1) Consumers have lost
all control over how personal information is collected and used
by companies; (2) Most businesses handle the personal information they collect about consumers in a proper and confidential
way (reverse scored); and (3) Existing laws and organizational
practices provide a reasonable level of protection for consumer
privacy today (reverse scored).06 I averaged the items to create a
composite (a = .72) coded so that higher scores indicated greater
privacy concern.
For the sample's distributions on these, see text accompanying notes 192-93.
For an overview of Westin's work, see Ponnurangam Kumaraguru and Lorrie
Faith Cranor, Privacy Indexes: A Survey of Westin's Studies *5-16 (Institute for Software
Research International, Dec 2005), online at http://reports-archive.adm.cs.cmu.edu/anon
isri2005/CMU-ISRI-05.138.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
206 See id at *13.
204

205
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As with the Westin-privacy-concern questions, it was also
desirable to create composite scores for the different types of
searches. There was no reason to believe that the factors underlying privacy concerns about e-mail would be fundamentally different than the factors underlying privacy concerns about text
messages, for example. The searches were therefore divided into
three types. First were the electronic-content-related searches
(all except powering the device on and dismantling it). Second
were the low-severity traditional searches (the customs form,
asking where the person had traveled, the simple drug-dog sniff
search, opening the bag but not reading its contents, and the
pat-down). Third were the remaining traditional searches. This
division between high- and low-severity traditional searches was
somewhat arbitrary; factor analysis did not yield clear and consistent groupings. But, based on the scores reported in Table 1,
it seemed highly sensible to differentiate between searches that
are routine and seen as generally low in intrusiveness and those
that are not. The division was created based on whether more
than 50 percent of the respondents believed that the search
could be conducted on any traveler.207
Correlations were then conducted to examine the relationships between each of the search composite variables and each
of the personality and demographic variables. Results are shown
in Table 3. Several interesting patterns emerged. Most notably,
the Westin privacy composite, which facially appears to tap
information-privacy concerns, correlated with each of the three
electronic-search composites such that those higher in privacy
concern saw the searches as more intrusive, more embarrassing,
and more likely to reveal sensitive information. The Westin
composite does not correlate with views toward the low-severity
searches and has a less consistent relationship with views toward the high-severity searches. Interestingly, neither political
orientation, nor education, nor age correlated with the electronicsearch attitudes.
In fact, political orientation does not appear to have any
consistent relationship with search attitudes generally. Very few
of the correlations are significant and, ignoring significance levels,
about half the correlations are negative and about half are positive.
The only significant effect is that the more socially conservative a

207 The lowest value in the high-severity category was 68 percent and the highest in
the low-severity category was 38 percent.
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person is, the more he or she feels that high- and low-severity
searches reveal sensitive information.20s This is somewhat surprising given that there is a very slight negative correlation
(r(285) = -.12, p = .04) between Westin's privacy composite and
social conservatism.

208 Note that all three measures used response scales ranging from "Very Liberal" to
"Very Conservative." The items are termed "conservatism" only because higher values
indicated greater conservatism and lower values greater liberalism.
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TABLE 3. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SEARCH ATTITUDES BY
CATEGORY AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
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It was also possible to examine whether the degree to which
people felt that their electronic devices could reveal different
types of information about them affected their attitudes toward
electronic searches. Correlations were conducted between the
three electronic-search composites and the degree-of-exposure
questions. Some categories of information were surprisingly unrelated to search attitudes, including banking information, prescriptions, educational records, and credit reports. Romantic
interests, information about family and friends, ideology, and
pornography interests, on the other hand, were the most consistently related to search attitudes, particularly expected embarrassment. In fact, seven of the eleven information domains
correlated significantly with embarrassment ratings, but only
four with revealing sensitive information and two with electronic
intrusiveness.
TABLE 4. ATTITUDES TOWARD ELECTRONIC SEARCHES AS A
FUNCTION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH DIFFERENT TYPES OF
INFORMATION WERE ON THE PARTICIPANT'S OWN ELECTRONIC

DEVICES

Learn More From

Electronic
Intrusiveness

Banking Records
Prescription Records
Medical Info
Romantic Life
Educational Records
Credit Records
Recent Purchases
Income
Pornography Interests
Ideology
Info on Family and Friends

.053
.044
.102
.136*
.035
.019
.113
.068
.103
.042
.137*

*p

Electronic
Reveal
Info
.038
.041
.060
.127*
.046
.013
.079
.063
.120*
.128*
.148*

Electronic
Embarrass
.088
.096
.145*
.186**
.100
.007
.159**
.170**
.159**
.206***
.208***

<.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001

4. Differences among types of participants.
Particularly given that the sample was not perfectly representative of the population, it is important to consider the ways
in which participant characteristics could have impacted search
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attitudes. As shown in Table 3, participant age and political ideology had little bearing on search attitudes generally and no relation to attitudes toward electronic searches. A series of ANOVAs were used to test whether various dichotomous
demographic characteristics had any effect on the nine searchattitude composites. Sex had no significant effects on any of the
nine composites. Whether the participants currently held a valid
passport or had traveled outside the country in the past year also
had no significant effect on any composite. Whether the person
had traveled outside the United States in the last five years
produced a single significant difference: participants who had
done so felt that the high-severity searches were marginally less
likely to reveal sensitive personal information (M = 57.63, SD =
19.75) than those who had not (M = 62.62, SD = 20.30) (F(1, 282)
= 4.09, p = .04, 12 = .014).
Whether the person had traveled outside the United States
at any point did affect views of some search types. As shown in
Table 5, those who had traveled internationally thought that the
low-severity searches-the types of searches that travelers are
routinely subjected to-were less intrusive, less embarrassing,
and less likely to reveal sensitive information. They also felt
that high-severity searches were less embarrassing and less
likely to reveal sensitive information, but to a much lesser extent
(note the effect sizes). There were no differences on the electronic
searches or on the perceived intrusiveness of high-severity
searches.
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TABLE 5. DIFFERENCES BASED ON EXTENT OF PRIOR TRAVEL
EXPERIENCE
Had the participant ever
traveled outside the United
States?
Search
Category

T12

Yes

No

89.37 (13.09)

90.40 (13.92)

0.34

.001

80.31 (20.18)

83.71 (21.16)

1.57

.006

74.08 (23.06)

77.24 (23.56)

1.05

.004

37.58 (19.14)

45.66 (23.19)

8.98**

.031

Low-Severity

32.47 (19.98)

44.63 (24.00)

18.77'**

.063

Reveal io
Low-Severity
Embarrass

30.72 (20.56)

39.87 (23.44)

10.40"*

.036

0.32

.001

6.73**

.023

4.18*

.015

Electronic
Intrusiveness
Electronic
Reveal Info
Electronic
Embarrass
Low-Severity
IntrSiveness
Intrusiveness

High-Severity
78.26 (13.34) 79.36 (17.19)
Intrusiveness
High-Severity
58.58 (19.32) 65.40 (21.05)
Reveal Info
High-Severity
67.46 (17.12) 72.31 (19.91)
Embarrass
* <.05; **p <.01; ***p < .001

F(1, 281)

It could be that travelers have become hardened to the lowseverity searches from frequent exposure. In contrast, travelers
almost never experience the electronic searches,29 so those who
have been abroad have not become more accustomed to them.
This explanation is reminiscent of the circularity critique of reasonable expectations of privacy: it is reasonable to expect that
which the government does often and reasonable to expect to be

209 From October 2009 through April 2010, 168.2 million travelers entered the United
States. Of these, 3.7 million (2.2 percent) were referred for secondary inspection, during
which they were questioned and searched at greater length. Of these, 2,272 were subjected to inspection of electronic devices, or approximately 325 per month out of approximately 530,000 travelers. See Corbett, 81 Miss L J at 1299-1300 (cited in note 159).
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free from that which the government does rarely.210 The Supreme
Court has stated, however, that holding a subjective expectation of
privacy invasion need not remove Fourth Amendment protection.
When an individual's subjective expectations are conditioned by
"influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms," a normative inquiry is proper. 211 For example, the Court
might still recognize some Fourth Amendment protection were
the government to announce a broad program of electronic
searches, removing the subjective expectation of privacy.
On the whole, however, it appears that participants' views
of border searches do not differ substantially based on their personality and demographic characteristics. No differences were
observed for sex, having a valid passport, or having traveled in
the preceding year, and only weak and inconsistent differences
were observed for age and political ideology. Taken together
with the correlation data in Table 3, this suggests that concern
about the intrusiveness of searches at the border is not being
driven by a particular group or category. People may have predicted that young people or liberals, for example, would be much
more concerned about border searches. That does not appear to
be the case in this sample.
IV. APPLYING THE RESULTS TO POLICY
The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy expectations
"that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'' 212 The
meaning of this reasonableness requirement has never been entirely clear.213 Some scholars, such as Professor Slobogin, have
treated the actual feelings and expectations of ordinary citizens
as absolutely crucial, believing that the magnitude of the state's
interest in performing a search should be weighed directly
against the people's assessment of the search's intrusiveness.214
Other scholars have proposed a more limited role for public opinion. Professor Kerr, for example, believes that Fourth Amendment
210

See Kerr, 107 Mich L Rev at 958 (cited in note 190) (discussing the meaning of

intrusiveness).
211 Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735, 740 n 5 (1979).
212 Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan concurring). See also
Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735, 739-40 (1979) (observing that Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz offers the prevailing test for the application of the Fourth Amendment).
213 See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 Stan L Rev
503, 504-05 (2007) (noting that the Katz test "remains remarkably opaque").
214 See Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The New Government Surveillance
and the Fourth Amendment 32-33 (Chicago 2007).
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decisions can be best understood as combining four different
models of reasonableness, each of which has been employed by
the Court on different occasions.215 Two of these models turn on
public expectations. The probabilistic model asks whether a sensible person would expect to have his or her privacy protected in
a given circumstance,216 and the private-facts model asks whether
the search is likely to reveal information that is "particularly
private.217 The other two models do not turn on public expectations: one asks whether the search requires a violation of positive law and the other whether the search is favored or disfavored on policy grounds.21
But even judges and policymakers adhering to Kerr's more
restricted view of the role of public attitudes should be concerned about these data. The (presumably sensible) participants
in this study reported that they believed that their electronic
devices were free from searches absent at least reasonable suspicion. They also reported that searches of their laptops would
reveal a great deal of personal and embarrassing information,
more than would other searches. The probabilistic and privatefacts models would therefore both support the conclusion that
electronic searches should be restricted. Though these data are
not the end of the analysis for Kerr (or even for Slobogin, who
would weigh the state's interest), they should have some role in
the reasonableness evaluation.
The present data also bear directly on the factors that the
Court has held are relevant to the reasonableness of a border
search. In Flores-Montano,the Court stated that highly intrusive
searches of the person require some level of suspicion because
they implicate the dignity and privacy interests of the person being
searched.219 Based on Montoya de Hernandez, the archetypal
highly intrusive searches of the person are strip searches and
body cavity searches.220 The data reported here show that
searches of electronic devices invoke privacy and dignity concerns to the same extent as body cavity and strip searches.221
Specifically, electronic-device searches are more revealing of
sensitive personal information and almost as embarrassing.
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

See Kerr, 60 Stan L Rev at 505-06 (cited in note 213).
Id at 508.
Id at 512.
See id at 522-23.
Flores-Montano,541 US at 152.
See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 US at 541 n 4.
See Part III.D.1.
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Therefore, if body cavity and strip searches at the border require
reasonable suspicion because of the privacy and dignity concerns
that they raise, so too should searches of electronic devices.
The data also show that people believe that their devices reveal a great deal about their lives. One pro-privacy commentator
argues that "a laptop search could reveal just as much private
information about a person as a strip search or other intrusive
body search can, albeit of a different kind."222 These data suggest
that she understated the concern; people believe that more information is revealed from a laptop search than a strip search. If
one conceives of intrusiveness in terms of privacy violation, then
electronic searches are not merely among the most troubling,
they are the most troubling.
This focus on information revelation helps show what is new
about searches of electronic devices. Previous cases, such as FloresMontano, have talked about the physical disruptiveness of
searches because, in those cases, the objects seized were physical.
Here the concern is information privacy, which raises a completely different set of issues.223 If a physical object is handled
and then returned promptly and intact, little harm has been
done. If privacy has been "handled," it cannot be returned.
Since substantial privacy interests are implicated in searches
of electronic devices, it is worth reconsidering the purposes
underlying the government's countervailing interest in extensive border searches. The doctrine was created to control "who
and what may enter the country.224 Information does not generally cross the border at a checkpoint, nor does it fly into O'Hare
and go through customs. Some commentators have argued that
the border search exception should be seen as one of the many
types of special-needs searches and, like the Terry stop, should
be limited to its intended purpose.2 25 A Terry stop is intended to
protect police officers and the public at large from imminent
threats, and its scope is limited to that aim.226 An officer conducting

222
223
224
225

Alzahabi, Note, 41 Ind L Rev at 179 (cited in note 6).
See id at 178-79.
Ramsey, 431 US at 620.
See, for example, Alzahabi, Note, 41 Ind L Rev at 176 (cited in note 6); Sid Nadkarni,
Comment, "Let's Have a Look, Shall We?"A Model for Evaluating Suspicionless Border
Searches of Portable Electronic Devices, 61 UCLA L Rev 148, 166-67 (2013); Ari B.
Fontecchio, Note, Suspicionless Laptop Searches under the Border Search Doctrine: The
Fourth Amendment Exception That Swallows Your Laptop, 31 Cardozo L Rev 231, 23944 (2009).
226 See Terry, 392 US at 26.
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a Terry stop can pat a person down for weapons but cannot
probe for other contraband.227 Perhaps the scope of border
searches should be limited to keeping out illegal aliens and contraband, rather than extending to the pursuit of unrelated criminal
investigations. This would remove the need for most searches of
electronic devices.
With this in mind, it is worth considering the case of David
House. House was a supporter of Chelsea (formerly Bradley)
Manning, who leaked classified documents to Wikileaks.228
Based on his activism, House was flagged to be searched at the
border when he next left and reentered the country. 22 9 As a result,
he was intercepted upon returning from Mexico and his computer
was extensively searched.30 In part because of ACLU intervention, House was able to pursue his claim against the government
and ultimately reached a settlement giving him both access to
documents describing how he had been targeted and an agreement that the seized data be destroyed.231
House's case shows the danger of allowing the government
to use border crossings as an excuse to conduct searches unrelated to border security. The purpose of the border search exception is not to provide a pretext to circumvent the usual requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The exception exists to protect
the nation from those threats that are uniquely present at border crossings. These are, as Ramsey reminds us, the exclusion of
physical contraband and undesired persons. 2 2 Neither purpose
requires, or is even meaningfully facilitated by, electronic-device
searches.
CONCLUSION

The Fourth Amendment analysis weighs the privacy and
dignity interests of the person being searched against the
227 Id at 27.
228 See House v Napolitano,2012 WL 1038816, *2 (D Mass).
229

Id.

230 Id at *3.
231 See Ryan Gallagher, Government Settles with Researcher Put on Watch List for
Supporting Bradley Manning, Slate Future Tense Blog (Slate May 30, 2013), online at
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future-tense/2013/05/30/david-houseresearcher-put on-watch
-listfor--supporting-bradley-manning.html (visited Aug 12, 2014). House's claim that his
targeting was in response to his political activities and violated his First Amendment
right to free association survived a motion to dismiss. See House, 2012 WL 1038816 at
*10-13. For the settlement agreement, see https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/house
_settlement.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
232 See Ramsey, 431 US at 620.
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government's need to conduct the search. The government's
need is presumed to be quite strong at the border, so the balance
generally tilts in its favor. But theories of the Fourth Amendment generally require some consideration of public attitudes.
The data presented here demonstrate that the privacy and dignity interests implicated in searches of electronic devices are
very powerful. They are more powerful, in fact, than some courts
have presumed. Though these interests need not be decisive,
they must be weighed.
Imposing a reasonable suspicion standard for searches of
electronic devices would be a fairly modest step given the
strength of the privacy interests implicated. Electronic-device
searches are seen as among the most intrusive of those described in the current case law. They are the most revealing of
sensitive information. They are only less embarrassing than
strip searches and body cavity searches. And, finally, most people
believe that such searches require not only reasonable suspicion,
but also a warrant from a judge. The privacy interests at stake
in these searches are therefore very strong.
When the Framers wrote the Fourth Amendment and later
carved out an exception for border searches, they did not foresee
the smartphone, the laptop, sexting, or cloud storage. But it is
still worth recalling that the nineteenth century gave us cases
like Boyd v United States,33 which provided extensive protection
to one's personal papers. 34 Given such historic concern for the
privacy of correspondence and the avoidance of selfincriminating disclosures of documents, we should take seriously
the public's current resistance to these searches. Particularly,
we should give further thought to the extent and nature of the
government's interests. Is the government's need for electronic
searches at the border great enough to outweigh the dignity and
privacy interests that we now know are implicated?

233 116 US 616 (1886).
234 See id at 631-32 (stating that compelling the production of private papers "cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom").

